H ISTORY , H OPE , AND H EALTHY
S KEPTICISM
Joan MacLeod Heminway*
I appreciate the work Professor Murray does in his symposium essay, The
History and Hope of Social Enterprise Forms.1 He has been, and remains, a
leading voice on legal forms of business for social enterprises in the
United States. By suggesting reforms to the practices and laws governing
social enterprise entities in his essay, Professor Murray raises my hackles a
bit, as he surely knows. My primary reaction to the initial draft was:
"Modify social enterprise entity law? Why bother?" Professor Murray
knows I am not a fan of these statutory forms of social enterprise entity—
especially the benefit corporation. As a result, I needed to be convinced
that amendments to the laws governing these forms are worthwhile.
But before I get back to that thought, I must first confess that I would
not likely have begun to conduct research in the social enterprise field if
it were not for Professor Murray. He is not only a great leader in social
enterprise law (and a good friend), but also the person who convinced me
to look into and write on the law as it relates to social enterprise businesses.
Specifically, he invited me to a symposium saying (although this is not a
direct quote), "We really need someone to impose some securities law
wisdom on the social enterprise field. Could you please speak and write
about this?" I accepted the entreaty. It was such an enjoyable intellectual
exercise to dive into the related research. The article that resulted from
Professor Murray’s invitation, To Be or Not to Be (a Security): Funding ForProfit Social Enterprises,2 is one of my better cited pieces. It led to a number
of other articles and book chapters and, ultimately, to this comment.
In this comment, I play the role of the two-year-old in the room. Twoyear-old children are well known to ask “why,” and that is what I do here.
Specifically, this comment asks “why” in two aspects. First, I ask why we
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1 J. Haskell Murray, The History and Hope of Social Enterprise Forms, 22 TRANSACTIONS:
TENN. J. BUS. L. 207 (2021).
2 Joan MacLeod Heminway, To Be or Not to Be (a Security): Funding For-Profit Social
Enterprises, 25 REGENT U. L. REV. 299 (2013).
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do (or should) care about making modifications to existing social
enterprise practices and laws. Second, assuming we do (or should) care, I
ask why Professor Murray’s changes make sense. My commentary is largely
restricted to the benefit corporation form because corporate forms loom
large in the debates relevant to Professor Murray’s essay and because the
benefit corporation is acknowledged to be the most widely adopted
corporate form as among the social enterprise forms of entity.3
So why do we care? Why should we care? Professor Murray answers
these questions in a general way by noting that social enterprise entities
seek to displace shareholder-centric norms and replace them with
management-centered decision-making norms focused more broadly on
society.4 He observes that even if shareholder-focused decision-making
norms are not firmly established in and by enforceable legal doctrine, they
may hold force as a matter of public belief. He avers: “[D]irectors will
often do what is expected of them.”5 Having formerly been part of teams
of lawyers who advised corporate boards, I concur with that observation.
As a result, he advises that “if the structure of corporate governance and
the incentives are not reconsidered, positive change is likely to be limited.”6
Indeed, as Professor Murray suggests, corporate law offers
governance structures and mandates that may disincentivize or incentivize
certain behaviors. Directors will act in accordance with the dominant
norms arising from those disincentives and incentives. As he describes, the
shareholder wealth maximization norm is a label for a dominant
touchstone arising from the existing legal framework applicable to
traditional for-profit corporations. As a result, we should expect directors
of for-profit corporations to act in accordance with that norm—to do
what the applicable norm directs them to do.
Public reinforcement of norms, including the shareholder wealth
maximization norm, may play a role in embedding those norms more
See, e.g., Ellen Berrey, Social Enterprise Law in Action: Organizational Characteristics of
U.S. Benefit Corporations, 20 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 21, 25 (2018) (‘While those
interested in using business strategies to accomplish social or environmental objectives
can choose from a growing menu of legal forms of enterprise, the benefit corporation h
as become the most popular option.”); Emily Winston, Benefit Corporations and the
Separation of Benefit and Control, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1783, 1799 (2018) (“[L]egal entities
have . . . arisen in the United States to facilitate social enterprise . . . . Of the legal forms
established to date, the most popular has been the benefit corporation . . . .”).
4 Murray, supra note 1, at 218.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 219.
3
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widely and deeply. Corporate directors may fear challenging norms that
have become part of public awareness and understanding. Legal advisors
to corporate board also may be impacted by this infiltration and
entrenchment process, causing them to elevate norms to the status of legal
rules in their reasoning.
Benefit corporations and other social enterprise corporate forms, as
Professor Murray explains, are designed to “disrupt” those processes as
they relate to the shareholder wealth maximization norm and its professed
(if not actual) unitary focus on shareholder financial wealth as the key
driver of corporate decision-making.7 As he indicates in his essay, these
corporate forms offer signals to the public and, through those signals, a
sense of hope—a warm glow of sorts that social or environmental
concerns will be valued in some form of corporation. Ultimately, it is hard
to substantiate or refute this premise. A lot of the information that we
have is anecdotal.
Paradoxically, valid concerns also have been raised about a distinctly
negative signaling effect of benefit corporation law.
The PBC [public benefit corporation] innovation may lead
judges to conclude that if corporate promoters want to deviate
from shareholder primacy, they must do so by using the Public
Benefit Corporation. The organizational and governance
requirements of the PBC are highly particular, and most of its
important features are mandatory. Thus, the Public Benefit
Corporation may inadvertently have narrowed flexibility in the
creation of corporations that alter the shareholder primacy
norm, rather than expanded it, as the PBC's proponents and
many commentators have presumed.8

Id. at 218 (“Social enterprise forms seek to disrupt the norm. Just names like
‘benefit corporations’ and ‘social purpose corporations’ suggest that these forms are not
shareholder-focused, but rather focused on the broader society.”).
8 David G. Yosifon, Opting Out of Shareholder Primacy: Is the Public Benefit Corporation
Trivial?, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 461, 463 (2017) (internal citations omitted); see also, e.g., Joan
MacLeod Heminway, Let's Not Give Up on Traditional For-Profit Corporations for Sustainable
Social Enterprise, 86 UMKC L. REV. 779, 799 (2018) [hereinafter Heminway, Let’s Not Give
Up] (“[L]aw scholars have begun to raise concerns that social enterprise legal forms may
be undesirable because they reinforce the doctrinal application of shareholder wealth
maximization norms well beyond the factual scenario presented in the eBay decision, both
in and outside the State of Delaware.”); Joan MacLeod Heminway, Shareholder Wealth
7
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This negative signaling effect persists despite relatively clear statutory
directives to the contrary. Specifically, benefit corporation legislation
typically instructs that its existence has no effect on corporate law outside
the benefit corporation context.9 These provisions have not yet been
tested in judicial adjudications, however. It is therefore possible that, rather
than affording us hope, benefit corporation law offers us a substandard,
narrow way to achieve social enterprise objectives—one that shuts off or
limits the inherent flexibility of traditional for-profit corporations by
restricting the discretion of the board of directors. I have argued
elsewhere that the statutory framework of benefit corporation law may
serve to constrain board authority to act in the interest of society and the
environment.10
Maximization as a Function of Statutes, Decisional Law, and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 939, 964 (2017) (“[L]egislatures are ‘sold’ on the existence of a shareholder
wealth maximization norm that may not be legal doctrine but may, by the legislature's
tacit endorsement, become public policy.”); Kevin V. Tu, Socially Conscious Corporations and
Shareholder Profit, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 121, 173 (2016) (“[T]he existence of Benefit
Corporations may reinforce the profit maximization norm.”). In an October 2020 weblog
post, Professor Stephen Bainbridge articulates his view that, “[i]f somebody wants a
Delaware corporation that has a purpose other than shareholder wealth maximization,
they have to go the . . . [benefit corporation] route.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Delaware
Business Corporation Cannot Opt Out of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm in its
Certificate of Incorporation, PROFESSOR BAINBRIDGE.COM (Oct. 8, 2020, 4:41 PM),
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/ (follow “Archives”
hyperlink; then follow “October 2020” hyperlink).
9 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 368 (2020) (“This subchapter shall not affect a
statute or rule of law that is applicable to a corporation that is not a public benefit
corporation, except as provided in § 363 of this title.”). Tennessee law specifically
provides that: “[N]o implication is made by, and no inference may be drawn from, the
enactment of this chapter as to whether, in exercising their duties, the officers or directors
of a domestic business corporation that is not a for-profit benefit corporation may
consider the impact of the corporation's transactions or other conduct on: (1) The
interests of those materially affected by the corporation's conduct, including the
pecuniary interests of shareholders; or (2) Any public benefit or public benefits identified
in its charter.” TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-109 (2020).
10 See Heminway, Let’s Not Give Up, supra note 8, at 800 (“[T]he stringent application
of shareholder wealth maximization doctrine in the TFPC and the nature of benefit
corporation doctrine conspire to decrease director discretion within the overall bounds
of the board's authority and, in turn, negatively impact the significance of the board
decision-making process under corporate law.”). Others have come to similar
conclusions. See Amy Klemm Verbos & Stephanie L. Black, Benefit Corporations as a
Distraction: An Overview and Critique, 36 BUS. & PRO. ETHICS J. 229, 258 (2017)
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For the sake of argument, however, let us assume that Professor
Murray’s hopeful vision of benefit corporation statutes prevails over more
negative conceptions of those legislated corporate frameworks. That
allows us to approach my second “why”—why Professor Murray’s
proposed enhancements to benefit corporations and the statutory law
governing them make sense. Said another way, why do the recommended
changes he offers work to ensure that benefit corporations can better serve
the ostensibly noble purposes for which they are designed?
Professor Murray’s suggestions include both changes in financial
compensation incentives (providing for an exercise date for director stock
options that extends out twenty-five or more years after the date of
grant—rather than more customary near-term exercise dates—to
encourage fealty to “the stakeholders who are necessary to carry the
corporation that far”)11 and changes in corporate governance and related
operations (to “elevate nonshareholder stakeholders rights”).12 He notes
that these latter governance and operational modifications might include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

affording more stakeholders standing to sue;
giving more stakeholders the ability to elect members of the
corporation’s board;
involving stakeholders in creating and monitoring the corporation’s
public benefit plans;
giving long-term shareholders increased voting rights;
clarifying and enforcing statutory social reporting mandates;
limiting social enterprise status to firms operating in specific industries
or using specified hiring practices or compensation metrics;
capping executive compensation; and
paying employees a living wage or better.13

(“concluding that benefit corporations are legally unnecessary or [un]desirable” and
offering “cautions about unintended potential to change corporate law, legal uncertainty
for directors, and . . . the wisdom of including a third party standard in entity formation
legislation.”); Yosifon, supra note 8, at 506 (finding that “[t]he benefit corporation model
. . . threatens to create a social policy ‘mirage’ of responsiveness to the problems attendant
to shareholder-primacy firms. . . . In this sense, creating benefit corporations is worse
than doing nothing, because at least if nothing had been done nobody could think that
something significant had been done.” (footnote omitted)).
11 See Murray, supra note 1, at 219-20.
12 Id. at 220-21.
13 Id.
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Overall, Professor Murray’s ideas posit a move away from the
shareholder-centric rules that govern traditional for-profit corporations.
In theory, by relaxing shareholder-focused constraints associated with forprofit corporate legal rules and traditions, benefit corporations can be
better held accountable to broader stakeholder interests.
Professor Murray’s observation that shareholder governance rights are
fundamental to benefit corporation accountability mechanisms and
enforcement is unassailable. His footnotes include citations to the work
of others who share his observations about specific shareholder-dominant
accountability practices and processes.14 Benefit corporation statutes—
which are built into existing statutes governing traditional for-profit
corporations—allow shareholders to bring derivative litigation and elect
the directors who constitute the governing body of the firm. 15 That
accountability to shareholders is a core value of the traditional for-profit
corporate form. As Professor Murray notes, shareholders possess all of
14 Id. at 219 n.73 (noting in the parenthetical “ultimate accountability in the hands of
the shareholders in the form of voting rights and the benefit enforcement proceeding”).
15 Typically, benefit corporation acts include special qualifications for shareholder
derivative litigation that layer onto more general derivative litigation authorizations under
state corporate law. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (2020) (providing specific
requirements for shareholder derivative actions and other litigation to enforce benefit
corporation director fiduciary duties); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-108 (2020) (providing
specific requirements for derivative actions to enforce benefit corporation director
fiduciary duties). However, general corporate law statutes alone normally govern benefit
corporation director elections in the same way that they govern all other corporate
director elections. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(3) (2020) (“Directors shall be
elected by a plurality of the votes of the shares present in person or represented by proxy
at the meeting and entitled to vote on the election of directors . . . .”); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 48-17-209(a) (2020) (“Unless otherwise provided in the charter, directors are elected by
a plurality of the votes cast by the shares entitled to vote in the election at a meeting at
which a quorum is present.”). As a general matter, benefit corporation acts expressly
outline the relationship of their contents to those of the corporate law. See, e.g., DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 361 (2020) (“If a corporation elects to become a public benefit
corporation under this subchapter in the manner prescribed in this subchapter, it shall be
subject in all respects to the provisions of this chapter, except to the extent this
subchapter imposes additional or different requirements, in which case such
requirements shall apply.”); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-28-102 (2020) (“If a corporation,
organized under the Tennessee Business Corporation Act . . . elects to become a forprofit benefit corporation under this chapter in the manner prescribed in this chapter,
the corporation shall continue to be subject in all respects to the Tennessee Business
Corporation Act, except to the extent that this chapter imposes additional or different
requirements, in which case the requirements of this chapter shall apply.”).
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the key legal means of holding directors accountable under current
corporate law (including benefit corporation law).16 I agree that this aspect
of benefit corporation legislation is something we need to alter if benefit
corporations are to best serve their intended public policy goals.
I might add that the focus of management fiduciary duties in the
benefit corporation also deserves attention. In an earlier work, I noted
that some benefit corporation statutes require directors, in exercising their
fiduciary duties, to consider constituencies not expressly served by the
corporation’s explicit chartered purpose.17 I also noted in that same work
that some statutes seem to better connect a benefit corporation’s
expressed statutory purpose to director fiduciary duties.18 Consistency in
the content and application of managerial fiduciary duties in
benefit corporations is lacking. Appropriately tailored, standardized
fiduciary duties, consistently applied, should enhance the overall value of
the benefit corporation as a form of business association for social
enterprises.
If benefit corporation managers are not held accountable to the
stakeholders expressly called out to be served by the corporation’s public
purpose—if those stakeholders cannot hold management’s feet to the fire
(including as beneficiaries and enforcement agents of managerial fiduciary
duties)—then benefit corporations are unlikely to get more than
superficial traction as instruments for social enterprise. The relative lack
of success of “other constituency” statutes has proven that to us; the
relative lack of legal force enjoyed by corporate social responsibility
practices also has proven that to us. If managers do not owe duties to
those who are intended to benefit from them and if those intended
beneficiaries cannot enforce any duties intended for their benefit,
accountability is not assured, compliance with those duties may be barely
more than voluntary, and systemic shifts necessary to real change are
unlikely to occur.
Murray, supra note 1, at 219 (“In benefit corporations and similar social enterprise
forms, shareholders—not other stakeholders—hold the accountability tools.”).
17 See Joan MacLeod Heminway, Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held
U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 611, 623 (2017) (citing
Lyman Johnson, Pluralism in Corporate Form: Corporate Law and Benefit Corps., 25 REGENT
U. L. REV. 269, 289 (2013)) (“[M]any benefit corporation statutes . . . require the board
to consider, along with that public benefit, constituencies other than those related to the
public benefit.”).
18 Id. at 623–24.
16
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These governance and related operational considerations are at the
heart of the challenges addressed by Professor Murray in his essay.
However, before closing, it seems important to come back to—and call
out for specific attention—the equity compensation aspects of the benefit
corporation conundrum, which he also raises. Specifically, Professor
Murray notes that “[d]irectors are often paid in stock options and are
publicly commended for rises in stock price.”19 Compensating directors
with equity and equity-based derivatives is likely to keep the focus of those
directors on market prices and, as a result, investor financial wealth
gratification. Thus, equity and equity-based compensation (which
collectively comprise “equity incentives”) is undoubtedly an important
factor for consideration in the benefit corporation context, alongside
corporate governance and operations.
Indeed, this entire area at the intersection of corporate finance and
management compensation (and the related suggestion to push back the
exercise date on director stock options) deserves more attention as a
matter of both thought and research, including through contextual legal
analyses (under, e.g., federal and state income tax law and securities
regulation) and empirical study. For example, as to legal analyses, it seems
fair to note that incentive stock options qualified under federal income tax
law must expire no later than ten years after the date of grant.20 No such
restriction exists for nonqualified stock options. Moreover, in terms of
empirical research, we have little understanding of the investor base for
social enterprise entities. There may or may not be a different kind of
person that invests in social enterprise—one that may not care as much
about stock price, especially in the short term. It remains unclear whether
changing the prototypical terms of stock options could shift the dominant
focus of directors away from shareholder wealth generation.
Having said that, compensation structures generally may hold some
promise in counterbalancing director fixation on stock price as a key
marker in shareholder value generation and maximization. Equity and
non-equity incentives—including bonus programs—may be built partially
Murray, supra note 1, at 219.
See 26 U.S.C. § 422(b)(3) (2018) (“For purposes of this part, the term ‘incentive
stock option’ means an option granted to an individual for any reason connected with his
employment by a corporation, if granted by the employer corporation or its parent
or subsidiary corporation, to purchase stock of any of such corporations, but only if . . .
such option by its terms is not exercisable after the expiration of 10 years from the date
such option is granted . . . .”).
19
20
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or exclusively around performance measures other than stock price.
Equity incentives based on the achievement of internal corporate goals—
performance metrics centered on the social enterprise’s corporate purpose
as expressed in its charter or other corporate aims communicated through
a charter, bylaw, or policy provision that expresses the ethos and value of
the firm—may be more appropriate in the benefit corporation context. I
appreciate the fact that Professor Murray’s essay called out director
compensation as an area worthy of consideration in strengthening the
efficacy of social enterprise firms, including benefit corporations. It
deserves more thought and study.
In conclusion, having asked why we do or should care about modifying
benefit corporation practices and law, I am satisfied—even if not wholly
persuaded—that there is a reason to care. Benefit corporations may alter
mindsets in a positive way, even if they do not positively or meaningfully
alter applicable legal principles.21 And having asked (assuming a reason to
care) why Professor Murray’s ideas for practical and legal change may make
sense, I am convinced that Professor Murray generally has the right idea
in calling for more accountability to a broader base of stakeholders—
beyond just shareholders. However, the details of that shift in
accountability remain to be fleshed out in detail. He highlights “increasing
stakeholder rights, realigning director incentives, and strengthening social
reporting.”22 I can agree with at least the first two ideas. I remain uncertain
about the third, however, merely because the utility and expense of social
reporting are a much larger question mark for me. In any event, I hope
that in future work Professor Murray will develop a specific set of
proposals to reform benefit corporation practices and laws for the
betterment of social enterprise.

See Murray, supra note 1, at 208 (“[I]t is the possibility of shifting norms, not law,
that is the true hope of social enterprise forms”).
22 Id.
21

